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Abstract— Smart building management systems rely on sen-
sors to optimize the operation of buildings. If an unauthorized
user gains access to these sensors, a privacy leak may occur.
This paper considers such a potential leak of privacy in a
smart residential building, and how it may be mitigated through
corrupting the measurements with additive Gaussian noise. This
corruption is done in order to hide the occupancy change in an
apartment. A lower bound on the variance of any estimator that
estimates the change time is derived. The bound is then used to
analyze how different model parameters affect the variance. It
is shown that the signal to noise ratio and the system dynamics
are the main factors that affect the bound. These results are
then verified on a simulator of the KTH Live-In Lab Testbed,
showing good correspondence with theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing trend of employing smart meters in
the home, facilitating utility tracking in order to help lower
costs. For example, choosing when to use energy to heat your
home could be made more flexible with thermal batteries [1].
Automatic control for heating and cooling systems is a
popular research topic. A common way to reduce energy
usage has been to employ predictive controllers on HVAC
systems [2]–[5]. Predictive controllers usually need user-
generated in order to work properly. This data contains in-
formation about the users’ preferences, behaviors, and other
private information. Historically, security measures against
privacy breaches have mostly dealt with keeping an adversary
from obtaining this data. Recent research focuses instead on
how someone with access to the data may abuse it for other
purposes than what it was intended for. A common concern
is that there is no consensus around the definition of privacy,
since it is application dependent.
In computer science, differential privacy is a concept
that is widely used when protecting against those types of
privacy attacks. A differentially private database can release
structures and patterns of its data to anyone, but manages
to keep the individual entries private. Typically, the released
data is corrupted with additive noise from slowly decaying
distributions [6]. The notion of differential privacy has been
extended to dynamical systems as well. In [7], the individual
inputs to a multiple input system are kept from being
estimated by injecting noise in the output.
Another example of privacy is considered in [8]. There
a battery is placed between a household and a smart meter
measuring energy consumption. The battery injects additive
noise in order to corrupt the signal such that the estimation
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variance of the true consumption is made large through the
minimization of the Fisher information. These results are
expanded for constrained noise in [9], where the adversary
is able to send queries to a more general database.
In this paper, privacy leakage refers to the ability to
infer user behavior from a set of measurements. These
measurements are taken from a system that the user has
interacted with. The user behavior is modeled as an input
to a linear system, where the measurements are used in
order to reconstruct this input. Input reconstruction is a well-
researched problem, where conditions on what sensors are
needed for reconstruction, so called input-output observabil-
ity, have been investigated in, for example, [10]–[12].
Here, on the other hand, the ability to reconstruct the
input from measurements is not primarily limited by the
sensors, but rather by how much the input is hidden by
additive Gaussian noise on the measurements. We restrict
ourselves to the cases of step inputs, turning the problem of
input reconstruction into a multiple hypothesis test problem,
known as the change point problem. Change point problems
are well-researched; see [13] and [14]. Defining privacy in
the realm of hypothesis testing has been considered in [15]–
[17], with privacy being defined as missed detection.
A central result is that there exist a uniform minimum
variance estimator (UMVE) for detecting the size of the step
changes, if the change time is known [18]. The authors also
show that a UMVE for unknown change times exists only
if the sampling rate goes to infinity. However, for unknown
change times and finite sampling density, no UMVE exists.
The change time is typically estimated by using a UMVE
on the amplitude change, conditioned on all possible change
times. In this paper, privacy is defined as the variance of the
estimated change time, for which we provide a lower bound
on in order to gain intuition on how to maximize privacy.
We focus on how the system dynamics affect the estimation
variance of the input when the measurements are corrupted
by additive Gaussian noise.
The paper is organized as follows, Section II introduces
the KTH Live-in Lab, which is a smart residential building.
The attack model is defined and then an example of a
privacy leak is given. The section concludes by defining a
defense strategy. Section III formulates the privacy problem
before a solution is presented in Section IV. Additionally, in
Section IV, a simple example depicts some important qual-
ities that affect the occupancy change estimation. Section V
returns to the KTH Testbed in order to reconnect with the
previous example and show how the results from Section IV
perform in a more realistic situation. Finally, the results are
concluded in Section VI.
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Fig. 1: A cross-sectional view of the KTH Testbed, showing
two separate apartments, the technical space below, and the
HVAC system.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section we show an example of how privacy can
be leaked through poorly protected sensors. First, let us
introduce the KTH Testbed and how a privacy leak may
occur. Subsequently we introduce a way to mitigate the leak.
A. KTH Live-In Lab Testbed
The data for this example is taken from the IDA ICE
4.8 software program for building simulations [19] of the
KTH Live-In Lab Testbed, (Fig. 1), [20]. The KTH Testbed
premises 120 square meters of living space, 150 square
meters of technical space and a project office of approx-
imately 20 square meters. In its current configuration the
living space features four apartments, but the layout can be
reconfigured for up to eight apartments.The KTH Testbed,
which is part of the larger Live-In Lab testbed platform,
is designed to be energetically independent, with dedicated
electricity generation systems through photovoltaic panels,
heat generation system (ground source heat pumps), and
storage (electricity and heat). Sensors are extensively used
to improve energy efficiency and indoor comfort, study
user behavior, and to improve control and fault detection
strategies.
While the KTH Testbed has several types of sensors that
could be used for detecting occupancy, we restrict ourselves
to the temperature and relative humidity sensors here, be-
cause they are easy to correlate with the occupancy. Since
there are multiple sensors of both types in each apartment,
we use the mean of the sensors. Fig. 2 shows the temperature
and relative humidity in a), and the occupancy in b) of
Apartment 2. The data was obtained using the IDA ICE 4.8
simulator, sampled once every 9 minutes for a week.
B. Attack Model
Let an adversary gain access to one of the types of sensors,
either the temperature or humidity. Assume that the adversary
has access to a linear time invariant model of the apartment
a)
b)
Fig. 2: The two graphs in plot a) show the temperature and
relative humidity in Apartment 2 simulated for one week.
The graph in plot b) shows the occupancy of the same
apartment during the week.
dynamics,
M0 :
{
xk+1 =Axk+Buk
yk =Cxk,
(1)
where xk ∈Rn is a vector of system states at each time
instance k, (uk)N−1k=0 is a sequence of scalar input signals
representing occupancy, with uk ∈{0,1} ∀k, and yk ∈R are
the measurements produced at time instance k. The system
matrices, A∈Rn×n, B ∈Rn×1 and C ∈R1×n define the
dynamics of the sequence of states (xk)Nk=0. Additionally,
the measurement window length is denoted by N and the 0.
The system parameters of (1) were determined from the
input-output data of Apartment 1, 2 and 4 (see Fig. 3)
using MATLAB’s System Identification Toolbox. An 8-state
system was obtained for both the temperature, denoted as
M t, and relative humidity, denoted as Mh. The IDA-ICE 4.8
simulator is non-linear, which makes (1) an approximation
of the true system. Apartment 3 was empty during the
simulation, with the intention to capture the effect that the
simulated weather has on the apartments, which the attacker
also has access to. However, since the weather affects each
apartment differently, it was not possible to completely
remove its effects, creating some difficulties when identifying
a good input-output model.
C. A Privacy Leak
Consider a person entering their apartment, which has
already reached a comfortable temperature and humidity
range. Usually, entering a room is similar to adding a source
of heat and humidity, almost instantly. One can model this
change as a step input signal to the system (1), uk = 1∈R
for k≥ k∗, and zero otherwise. The measurement of the step
response at each time step, yk, is sent to the controller.
Assume an adversary gains access to these measurements.
In order to estimate when the occupancy changes, the adver-
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Fig. 3: An overview of th apa tments in the KTH Testbed.
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Fig. 4: The graph shows the simulated change in occupancy
and how it affects the temperature over 20 hours. The data
is used to produce an estimate of the occupancy change.
sary tries to solve a change point problem, as is described in
Section I, since the signal yk behaves in one way up until k∗,
and after that, it behaves differently. The adversary estimates
the input by estimating the amplitude of the change through
minimization of the `2-norm, conditioned on all possible
change times, k∗. Later, the measurements will be corrupted
with additive Gaussian noise, and then the choice of this
particular estimator is justified, since it becomes equivalent
to the Full Information Estimator [21].
With this method, the adversary estimates the occupancy
change in Apartment 2. The results of the estimation using
the temperature sensor are shown in Fig. 4, together with
the true occupancy of the apartment. One can see that the
estimation correctly predicts the time step for when the
person gets home.
D. Defender Model
Assume that the defender of the system has limited re-
sources such that only one of the types of sensors in each
apartment can be made secure against privacy leaks. The
defender of the system needs to make a choice about which
of the measurements to leave susceptible to privacy attacks.
It is seen in Fig. 4 that it is relatively easy to estimate the
occupancy change unless the signal is somehow corrupted.
In the next section, we propose that the measurements be
corrupted with additive Gaussian noise in order to introduce
uncertainty in the estimation of the occupancy change. This
method is similar to earlier work; see [6] and [7], which also
propose corruptions using Gaussian or Laplacian noise in
order to introduce privacy in the form of Differential Privacy.
While adding a lot of noise to the sensor will hide the
input, there is usually a utility function that the controller is
trying to minimize, such as energy cost. Adding noise will
generally increase this quantity. Therefore it is important for
the defender to find a low noise level that ensures privacy.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider again the model of the system the adversary
desires to spy on (1). Let the measurements, defined as
Y = (yk)
N
k=0, yk ∈R, be corrupted by additive Gaussian
noise. The measurements are then generated by the system
M :
{
xk+1 =Axk+Buk
yk =Cxk+ek,
(2)
where (ek)Nk=0 is a sequence of zero mean, Gaussian noise
with E[ekel] =σ2δkl and δkl is the Kronecker delta.
Now consider an estimator ψ(Y,M), which may have
access to the system model, M , that tries to estimate the
sequence of inputs (uk)N−1k=0 from the outputs Y . As stated
in Section I, when the change time is not known, it needs
to be estimated first before the amplitude of uk can be
estimated. Guarding the change time from being estimated
becomes the first line of defense, which also justifies why
we only consider uk ∈{0,1}. Additionally, since there are
no UMVE for the change time, all possible estimators need
to be considered. In this setting, we seek to find what factors
affect the variance of the estimated change time.
Problem 1: Consider an estimator of k∗, denoted by
ψ(Y,M), that has access to the model (2) and the measure-
ments Y of length N such that N ≥ k∗. What is the minimum
variance that any such estimator can achieve?
Remark 1: Implicitly, the model in (2) gives the estimator
only access to one type of sensor. Note that only looking at
one sensor at a time is a restriction when performing the
analysis. We plan to expand to include the combination of
multiple sensors in future work.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Recall the definition of privacy as the variance of the
estimated change time. Problem 1 asks how much privacy
can be guaranteed in a privacy leak. In order to answer this
question, we present the main theoretical result of this paper.
Theorem 1: Consider any estimator of k∗, denoted by
ψ(Y,M), with bias g(k∗). Then
Var(ψ(Y,M)|k∗)≥max
τ
(τ+g(k∗+τ)−g(k∗))2
eS(τ,M)−1 =:B(M),
(3)
for τ ∈{1, ...,N−k∗}, where
S(τ,M) = 1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB
2 .
(4)
Proof: See the Appendix.
It is worth reiterating that the bound in (3) is limited
to single-input-single-output systems. Theorem 1 illustrates
all the important factors that should be considered when
deploying a sensor that is susceptible to privacy attacks.
In short, the bound is simply a function of the difference
between the two most similar responses, in the `2-norm. It
gives insight into the important elements of linear systems
that may cause information leaks. Let us analyze this bound
and its implications through a simple, one-state linear time
invariant system
M1 :
{
xk+1 = axk+buk
yk = cxk+ek,
(5)
where xk ∈R, yk ∈R, uk ∈{0,1}, and E[ekel] =σ2δlk. The
system parameters, a, b, and c are scalar as well, with a≥ 0.
For an unbiased estimator, the lower bound of the variance
is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Consider any unbiased estimator of k∗, de-
noted by ψ(Y,M1). Then
Var(ψ(Y,M1)|k∗)≥ 1
eS(M1)−1 =:B(M1), (6)
where
S(M1) = 1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
cak−1−k
∗
b
)2
. (7)
Proof: The result follows directly from Theorem 1 andmin(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
cak−1−lb
2≥(cak−1−k∗b)2 , k >k∗.
With these expressions, it is possible to analyse many
properties of the one-state system and how the different
parameters determine B(M1).
A. Signal to Noise Ratio
From the bounds, one can see that a large contributing
factor is how large of an effect the occupancy has on the
signal, as captured by the c
2b2
σ2 factor. This quantity is related
to the signal to noise ratio (SNR) squared. Without loss of
generality, c can be set to 1, since it is equivalent to changing
the noise variance by a corresponding factor. The ratio b
2
σ2
gives a clear indication that there is a trade-off between the
noise variance and how much the input affects the state.
The c
2b2
σ2 factor is one design parameter the defender can
determine, through the choice of the noise variance σ2. Nat-
urally, decreasing the SNR will increase the difficulty for the
attacker to estimate the change time k∗. But when it comes
to discriminating between the degree of privacy different
sensors provide, the impact of SNR can be sidestepped, since
different variances for different sensors can be chosen.
B. System Dynamics and Sampling
Another important component is the system dynamics,
which essentially determine for how many time steps there
exists a difference between different output signals. Intu-
itively, the longer the difference between two signals, the
easier it is to differentiate between them in the presence of
noise. Corollary 1 sheds light on why this happens through
the summation of the powers of a.
Proposition 1: Consider the single state system in (5) with
a= 1. Then
Var(ψ(Y,M1)|k∗)≥B(M1)→ 0, when N→∞.
Proof: Insert a= 1 in the summation (7), then
S(M1) = c
2b2
σ2
(N−k∗)→∞, as N→∞,
which in turn gives that the lower bound, B(M1)→ 0.
Thus any good estimator will always be able to estimate
the step change of integrator systems, given that enough
samples have been collected. Because step changes that are
initiated at different times never converge to the same value,
the possibility to sample a large amount of useful data
is created independently of the sample rate. Therefore, an
estimator will be able to obtain zero variance. The bound also
goes to zero for systems with unstable dynamics (‖a‖> 1).
In the unstable case, however, the rate of convergence to
zero for the bound in (6) is greater the “more” unstable the
system is.
In fact, the number of samples taken during the time steps
when the sensor signal is different from other potential sig-
nals seems to be the fundamental quantity which determines
the lower bound. The previous paragraph discusses this
phenomenon for integrators and unstable systems. Asymp-
totically stable systems (‖a‖< 1) have a similar property.
Proposition 2: Consider two systems with only one-state
as in (5), M11 and M
2
1 . Additionally, let 1>a2>a1> 0 with
all other system parameters remaining the same. Then, the
lower bounds satisfy
B(M11 )>B(M21 ).
Proof: The results follows from S(M21 )>S(M11 ).
Proposition 2 shows that it is easier to estimate the
change time in systems with slow dynamics, as opposed
to systems with fast dynamics. Slower systems allow for
more samples to be gathered during time steps when the
signals are different. This phenomenon can be seen directly
in the construction of the system matrix from zero-order hold
sampling of a continuous linear time invariant system,
x˙(t) = fx(t)+hu(t)
⇒x((k+1)∆t) = ax(k∆t)+bu(k∆t),
where a= e−f∆t, and that a→ 1 (an integrator) as ∆t→ 0.
The number of samples over the same time window goes to
infinity, causing B(M1) to decrease. Thus the designer can
influence the lower bound in (6) by changing the sampling
rate.
Naturally, the number of samples can also be increased
by increasing the time window, N , over which the sampling
takes place. As stated previously, for integrator systems, S
increases linearly and for unstable systems the summands
increase geometrically. For stable systems though, the sum-
mands decrease geometrically so that, beyond a certain time
step, the signal becomes similar to another signal that was
initiated at a different time step. Samples beyond this time
step will not produce any additional information to the
estimator. Therefore, any additional sampling beyond this
time step will no longer improve the estimation, which is of
interest when designing a finite time horizon estimator.
C. Sensor Design
Much of the intuition from the one-state system carries
over to the multiple state systems with some additional
technicalities. Specifically, the direction of vector B and how
it is transformed by A affects the estimation. Typically, the
designer of a system has some degree of choice when it
comes to designing C, by placing the sensor in a particular
place, which introduces another design parameter.
Denote the eigenvalues of A by λi, i∈{1,2,...,n} with
the corresponding eigenvectors, vi and where |λi| ≥ |λi+1|.
Assuming the eigenvectors vi form a basis, consider the
components of B with respect to this basis,
B=
n∑
i=1
bivi.
Using this basis, we can write the bound in (3) as,
S = 1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
n∑
i=1
λk−1−li biCvi
2 . (8)
By designing C in (8), it is possible to change the bound
on the variance in (3). Choosing C to be perpendicular to the
largest eigenvalues such that bi 6= 0, makes the sum converge
as fast as possible. The privacy leak is then contained to the
first few time steps. However, the variance is not necessarily
increased, since the largest summands often occur in the
beginning of the summation. This choice of C might make
these terms very large, thus making it easier to estimate the
change.
Conversely, one may design C such that CAlB is small
for the first few l≥ 0. The privacy leak in the first few time
steps will then be minimal. However, the variance will not
necessarily be decreased in this case either. If there is an
eigenvalue that is very close to 1 which is not removed by
C and bi 6= 0, then the sum (4) will be very large, due to the
slow convergence of the summands to zero.
V. EXAMPLE REVISITED
Let us return to the example from Section II of an
adversary gaining access to one of the sensors in Apartment 2
of the KTH Testbed. The lower bound in (3) is calculated
using the identified 8-state system from Section II-B. In
Table I, the lower bound B for the two signals are presented
with different σ2. The empirical variance of the estimate,
Vˆ , of 1000 trials is shown as well. One may see that the
bound holds in all cases, and the difference is less than an
TABLE I: SNR, Empirical variance Vˆ and the lower bound
B under different variances on the additive noise
Model σ2 SNR Vˆ [min2] B [min2]
Temperature, Mt 0.25 16.9 36.7 11.3
Humidity, Mh 0.25 204 11.9 3 ·10−8
Temperature, Mt 2.25 1.87 3490 300
Humidity, Mh 2.25 22.6 48 7.74
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Fig. 5: In a), the temperature measurements are shown
with additive Gaussian noise. In b), the histogram of 1000
estimates are shown together with the occupancy change.
order of magnitude in some cases. Also, both B and Vˆ are
large for small SNR, as was predicted in Section IV-A. In
Fig. 5, we provide a realization of the measured step change
in temperature from Apartment 2 using noise with σ2 = 2.25,
together with the simulated step change and the estimated
step change for 1000 trials.
The empirical variance, shown in Table I, is still larger
than B. One reason for this discrepancy is that there are more
factors corrupting the data. For example, the data is gener-
ated together with a weather model. Privacy is somewhat
increased due to the weather, since the attacker’s weather
model does not perfectly capture the impact that it has on
Apartment 2. The effect of the weather can be modelled as
process noise, which in turn, adds more stochasticity to the
system, further masking the input signal. Nonetheless, the
discrepancy in the variance is less than an order of magnitude
smaller for the temperature, which gives one an idea of how
tight the bound is. Also, a small increase in the noise variance
can increase the bound by a large magnitude, as seen in
Table I. Even though the SNR is very large in one case,
the relative small addition of measurement noise increases
the the empirical variance Vˆ by an entire time step. The
large increase shows that model uncertainties may amplify
the privacy introduced by measurement noise.
One may see that the empirical variance is much lower
for the humidity data compared to the temperature, which
is also reflected in the lower bound in Table I. Upon closer
inspection, one can see that the SNR is much larger for the
humidity compared to the temperature, which is probably
the main reason for the smaller variance in the humidity
TABLE II: The two largest eigenvalues, empirical variance
Vˆ and the lower bound B when noise with SNR= 4.
Model
∣∣λ1∣∣ ∣∣λ2∣∣ (CBσ )2 S Vˆ [min2] B [min2]
Mt 0.995 0.84 0.134 0.142 342 101
Mh 0.996 0.97 0.018 0.088 545 184
measurements. A designer might think that the humidity
sensor should be secured against privacy leaks. However the
comparison is not fair, since the defender is not restricted to
using the same noise for the different types of sensors.
In order to overcome this issue and isolate the effect the
system poles have on the estimation, we normalize all inputs
and outputs so that they are between 0 and 1. Table II
presents the results of estimating the change time for a
1000 performed trials. Now, the lower bound B(M) and the
empirical variance are lower for the temperature compared
to the humidity. These results imply that the defender should
make the temperature sensors secure.
By inspecting the slowest eigenvalues of the two models,
one can see that the humidity model has a slightly larger
maximum eigenvalue, and thus, should be easier to esti-
mate. Nevertheless, the impact of the largest eigenvalues
is not reflected in either B or Vˆ . Recall the discussion in
Section IV-C; there it is argued that not only the largest
eigenvalue determines the variance of the estimated change
time, but also the corresponding eigenvectors, which should
be a component of B and not be perpendicular to C>.
In fact, for both models model, b1≈ 0. The second largest
eigenvalues in both models are also shown in Table II, whose
eigenvectors are compatible with B and C. Nonetheless,
since the humidity model still is much slower than the
temperature model, it should be easier to estimate. In fact,
the eigenvalues impact all but the first summand of S(M),
and a slow eigenvalue causes a large growth in S(M) as
N grows. In Table II, one can see that this growth for the
humidity model is not large enough to even overcome the
first summand in S(M t).
The privacy leak in Mh for the first few time steps, is min-
imal since the corresponding C> and B are perpendicular to
each other. For M t, the privacy leak is concentrated on the
first time step, which is so large that even many samples of
the humidity would not be able to estimate a better change
time. With these results, one can say that the temperature
causes a larger privacy leak, when the defender applies the
same SNR to both models.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for analyzing how susceptible
sensors in smart buildings are to privacy leakage in terms
of occupancy change, where by privacy we mean whether
or not an adversary can infer user behavior from a set of
measurements. It is based on a fundamental lower bound
on the variance of estimated change time of occupancy for
any estimator. The lower bound was derived and then used
to analyze the privacy properties of a one-state system. The
results of this analysis showed how the SNR impacts the
lower bound on the variance. Additionally, we analyzed the
impact of the poles on the estimation, showing that unstable
and integrator systems are the easiest to estimate, followed
by slow stable systems; fast, stable systems are the hardest to
estimate. Finally, it was shown that a slow eigenvalue is not
enough to draw a conclusion about the privacy leakage. Thus,
the defender can use these results to decrease the privacy
leakage of a system or it can use the lower bound to ensure
privacy from an unknown attacker. These results were then
validated on data from a simulator of KTH Testbed using
one particular type of estimator.
As mentioned previously, an extension of the results to
privacy leakage for combinations of sensors is a track for
future work. Another extension is to investigate how process
noise increases privacy. The tightness of the bound in (3)
will also be explored in future research.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The estimator, ψ(Y,M), uses the measurements Y and the model M in order to estimate the change time k∗. Here, k∗
is a parameter which determines the probability distribution of Y . The minimum variance of the estimator is given by the
Hammersley-Chapman-Robbins bound [22],
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥ sup
τ 6=0
(
E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗+τ]−E[ψ(Y,M)∣∣k∗])2
E
[(
P (Y |k∗+τ)
P (Y |k∗) −1
)2 ∣∣∣∣k∗] ,
where τ ∈Z and P (Y |k∗) is the probability of obtaining measurements Y , conditioned on the change time is k∗. Evaluating
the expectation in the denominator gives
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥ sup
τ 6=0
(
E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗+τ]−E[ψ(Y,M)∣∣k∗])2∫
RN
P (Y |k∗+τ)2
P (Y |k∗) dY −1
. (9)
Since P (Y |k
∗+τ)2
P (Y |k∗) = e
2logP (Y|k∗+τ)−logP (Y|k∗), we write for τ ≥ 1,
logP (Y|k∗+τ)− logP (Y|k∗) =
−
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1B
)2
2σ2
+
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B
)2
2σ2
=
− 1
2σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB)(2yk−(2CAkx0 +
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B+
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1B)).
Continuing, we see that,
2logP (Y|k∗+1)− logP (Y|k∗) = 2(logP (Y|k∗+1)− logP (Y|k∗))+logP (Y|k∗) =
− 1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB)(2yk−(2CAkx0 +
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B+
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1B))
−
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B
)2
2σ2
=
− 1
2σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
yk−CAkx0− k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B+2
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB
2
+
1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB
2− k∗∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1B
)2
2σ2
.
Inserting this expression into the bound in (9), evaluating the integral, and setting E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗]= k∗+g(k∗), we obtain
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥max
τ≥1
(τ+g(k∗+τ)−g(k∗))2
eS(τ,M)−1 , with S(τ,M) =
1
σ2
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lB
2 . (10)
For τ ≤−1, an equivalent calculation can be made giving the same expression as (10), but replacing S with
S−(τ,M) = 1
σ2
N∑
k=kˆ+τ+1
min(kˆ−1,k−1)∑
l=kˆ+τ
CAk−1−lB
2 .
However, since
S(|τ |,M)≤S−(−|τ |,M),
for each positive integer |τ |, we can ignore the τ ≤−1 cases.
